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Abstract
We propose a search-matching model of the marriage market that extends Shimer and
Smith (2000) to allow for labor supply. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium when
exogenous divorce is the only source of risk. The estimated matching probabilities that
can be derived from the steady-state flow conditions are strongly increasing in both male
and female wages. We estimate that the share of marriage surplus appropriated by the man
increases with his wage and that the share appropriated by the woman decreases with her
wage. We find that leisure is an inferior good for men and a normal good for women.
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1 Introduction
One of the key issues in understanding how tax policies affect labor supply is the intra-household
allocation of time and consumption. This is in particular the case of welfare benefits, such as
the Working Family Tax Credit program in the UK and the Earned Income Tax Credit in the US,
aimed at providing work incentives and a safety net against poverty at the same time. The models
used to address these issues typically take the household as a unit with unitary preferences (e.g.
Eissa and Hoynes, 2004). The Collective models of the family (Chiappori, 1988, 1992) offer a
solution for improvement by modeling intrahousehold resource allocation, but the interest of this
framework for policy evaluation is in turn limited by its inability to predict the impact of welfare
policies on the sharing rule. Yet, the factors influencing the sharing rule, such as sex ratios or
rules about divorce, are now well understood.1 They are distribution factors conditioning the
process of match formation and implicitly determining the threats that each household member
can summon in the strategic negotiation for sharing resources. The ultimate model to evaluate
welfare policies for the family must therefore be an equilibrium model of both match formation
and intra-household resource allocation. The present paper offers one attempt at constructing
such a model.
The literature on the family can be broadly classified into three main strands. A first series
of papers address the issue of intra-household resource allocation for a given population of
families, without worrying about their formation. The oldest papers used bargaining models.2
Becker’s (1981) theory of the benevolent dictator is a special theory of efficient resource sharing
that does not use Nash bargaining. Chiappori’s Collective model is another one, in many ways
the least restrictive of all.3 Then, in the last ten years a large variety of search-matching models
of marriage markets have been proposed to explain certain stylized facts or trends such as
declining marriage rates or increasing female college graduation rates, and to analyze various
policies affecting the family.4 At the same time, the general theory of search and matching
in marriage markets (existence of equilibrium, multiplicity, conditions of positive assortative
mating, PAM, etc.) was further developed,5 but generated almost no empirical microeconomic
applications. Wong (2003) stands like one rare exception.
1See Grossbard-Shechtman (1984), Brien (1997), Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997), Chiappori, Fortin, and
Lacroix (2002), DelBoca and Flinn (2005), Amuedo-Dorantes and Grossbard (2007), Seitz (2009).
2See Manser and Brown, 1980, McElroy and Horney, 1981, Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, 1996).
3See Chiappori and Donni (2009) for a recent survey of non-unitary models of the household. Chiappori’s
seminal contributions generated a long list of papers building on the model of the family as a Pareto equilibrium.
We can only cite a few of them: Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene (1994), Fortin and Lacroix
(1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002), Mazzocco (2004, 2007), Blundell,
Chiappori, Magnac, and Meghir (2007), etc. Note also that the assumption of efficient allocations within the family
has been disputed, in particular, by DelBoca and Flinn (2005, 2006, 2009).
4See e.g. Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000), Greenwood, Guner, Knowles, Greenwood, Guner, and
Knowles (2000), Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002), Gould and Paserman (2003), Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles
(2005), Chiappori and Weiss (2006, 2007), Chiappori and Oreffice (2008)
5See e.g. Sattinger (1995), Lu and McAfee (1996), Burdett and Coles (1997), Shimer and Smith (2000), Sattinger
(2003), Eeckhout (1999), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010b,a).
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Recently, the perfect-information assignment framework of Shapley and Shubik (1971) was
revived in order to integrate the collective model within a matching framework.6 In this paper,
we aim at a similar target. However, instead of assuming a frictionless environment, we assume
that single individuals randomly search for a partner and that they can date only one person at a
time. We design a search-matching model of the marriage market with labor supply by building
on the seminal works of Sattinger (1995), Lu and McAfee (1996) and Shimer and Smith (2000).
The equilibrium model of this paper thus defines the outside option as the value of remaining
single, which is equal to the instantaneous utility of the wage plus the option value of an eventual
future marriage. Couples are formed when enough public goods are produced in the association.
The surplus is divided via Nash bargaining.
There are many reason that explain our preference for search models. First, casual experience
seems to suggest that it takes time and trial to find the right partner in life. Second, sequential
search naturally yields mismatch. Third, it is easy with a search model to deal with continuous
individual characteristics and difficult in a perfect-assignment model. Fourth and finally, forward
looking behavior and risk are natural ingredients of search-matching models.
Despite a rather complicated structure the model remains tractable thanks to the steady state
assumption. Although an important application of the matching framework is understanding
long-term demographic changes such as increasing divorce and remarriage rates, we assume
that these changes are slow enough for a steady state to hold at least approximately at all times.
In other words, flows can vary over time in a trended or cyclical way, but net flows must remain
small compared with gross flows. We show that steady-state flow conditions deliver important
identifying restrictions on matching probabilities, and indirectly on the relationship between
transfers—or the sharing rule defined as the share of male transfers in total transfers—and
wages.
The steady-state flow conditions relate the matching probability to wage distributions in
a simple way. Despite a small correlation between spouses’ wages (25%), we find that the
matching probability increases in both wages exponentially. So its shape is rather flat for most
wages but very steep when both wages cross the median. We take this result as a strong indication
of positive assortative matching, albeit unconventional.
Under the steady-state restriction, a lot of information can be drawn from cross-section
data. Using SIPP data we observe that married men earn more than anybody else, and that the
distribution of wages is about the same for married women, single women and single men. The
model’s estimates let us conclude from these facts that a man who is more productive in the labor
market is also more attractive in the marriage market both by the higher income that he brings to
the family and also by the larger public good value that he contributes to. Women contribute to
family income and marriage surplus in the same way, but female wage is a less efficient input of
household production than male wage. This makes a high wage a relatively less attractive trait
6See Choo and Siow (2006), Choo, Seitz, and Siow (2008b,a), Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2008), Siow (2009),
Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009), Chiappori, Salanie, and Weiss (2010).
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in a woman than in a man. Consequently, high-wage men are over-represented among married
couples and they are in a favorable position to bargain a higher share of the rent.
Hours worked do not bring any additional information on matching but allow to identify
preferences for consumption and leisure. Married men, at all wages, work more that anybody
else and married women less. We show that intrahousehold transfers cannot explain this fact.
High-wage men take a bigger share of the rent and high-wage women a smaller share. If men,
receiving bigger transfers, work more, it has to be that leisure is an inferior good for them. For
women, the opposite is true: more non labor income implies more specialization into household
production.
These results should not be taken at face value. The model is overly simplistic. First there
are many dimensions of individual heterogeneity that matter in marriage decisions. Second,
the reasons that make marriage attractive are certainly more sophisticated and diverse than
household production, the way we model it in this paper. Children, for example, are certainly an
important component of the marriage externality, which deserves to be properly modeled. Third
and lastly, but the list could be longer, individuals and couples are subject to shocks that we rule
out completely. Future versions of the model will see to that. This paper’s main achievement
is to show that search-matching models, with realistic distributions of individual heterogeneity,
are more than theoretical objects of interest, and that they can be used efficaciously in empirical
work.
The layout of the paper is as follows. First we construct the model. Second we study
identification. Third we estimate the model non parametrically. The last section concludes. An
appendix details the numerical techniques used to perform the nonparametric analyses.
2 The Model
The model builds on Shimer and Smith (2000), which we extend to allow for labor supply
decisions, non symmetric equilibria, and a general matching function, not necessarily quadratic
(Shimer and Smith) or linear (Tröger and Nöldeke, 2009).
2.1 Basic Setup
We consider a marriage market with Lm males and L f females. The number of married couples
is denoted by N and the respective numbers of single males and single females areUm = Lm−N
and U f = L f −N.
Individuals differ in labor productivity, x ∈ [x,x] for males and y ∈ [y,y] for females. Let
`m(x) and ` f (y) denote the density functions of the measures of males of type x and females of
type y, with Lm =
´
`m(x)dx and L f =
´
` f (y)dy. The wage densities for the sub-populations
of singles are um(x) and u f (y), withUm =
´
um(x)dx andU f =
´
u f (y)dy. The measure density
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of couples of type (x,y) is n(x,y), with N =
˜
n(x,y)dxdy and
`m (x) =
ˆ
n(x,y)dy+um (x) , (1)
` f (y) =
ˆ
n(x,y)dx+u f (y). (2)
In this paper, labor productivity is the only permanent source of individual heterogeneity. This
is also the first dimension to consider as we are interested in modeling family labor supply.
However, we shall later introduce a match-specific heterogeneity component.
We assume that only singles search for a partner, ruling out “on-the-marriage” search.
The number of meetings per period is a function of the numbers of male and female singles,
M(Um,U f ), and λi =
M(Um,U f )
Ui
is the instantaneous probability that a searching individual of
gender i= m, f meets with a single of the other sex. We also denote λ = M(Um,U f )UmU f .
All datings do not end up in wedlock. We assume that there exists a function α(x,y) ∈ [0,1]
indicating the probability that a match (x,y) be consummated. The matching probability is
an equilibrium outcome that will be later derived from fundamentals. The matching set is the
support of α . Lastly, matches are exogenously dissolved with instantaneous probability δ .
2.2 Equilibrium Flows
In steady state, flows in and out of the stocks of married couples of each type must exactly
balance each other out. This means that, for all (x,y),
δn(x,y) = um (x)λm
u f (y)
U f
α(x,y) = λum (x)u f (y)α(x,y). (3)
The left-hand side is the flow of divorces. The right-hand side measures the flow of new (x,y)-
marriages. It has three components: a single male of type x, out of the um(x) ones, meets a
single female with probability λm; this woman is of type y with probability u f (y)/U f ; the knot
is tied with probability α(x,y).
Integrating equation (3) over y, we obtain the steady-state flow condition for the stock of all
married males of type x:
δ
ˆ
n(x,y)dy= λum (x)
ˆ
u f (y)α(x,y)dy.
Using equation (1) to substitute
´
n(x,y)dy out of this equation yields
δ [`m (x)−um (x)] = λum(x)
ˆ
u f (y)α(x,y)dy,
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or, equivalently,
um(x) =
δ`m(x)
δ +λ
´
u f (y)α(x,y)dy
. (4)
By symmetry, the equation defining the equilibrium distribution of wages in the population
of single females is
u f (y) =
δ` f (y)
δ +λ
´
um(x)α(x,y)dx
. (5)
2.3 Optimal Labor Supply
Individuals draw utility from consumption and leisure. Let
vm(x,xT + t) =
xT + t−Am(x)
Bm(x)
, (6)
denote the indirect utility for a man of wage x and non-labor income t. T denotes total time
endowment, Bm(x) is an aggregate price index, with Bm(0) = 1, and Am(x) is the minimum
expenditure to attain a positive utility, with Am(0) = 0.7 The linearity of utility with respect to
non labor income will produce a simple rent sharing mechanism. But other specifications are
possible.
For tractability, we rule out labor market non participation. So, hours worked straightfor-
wardly follow from indirect utility by application of Roy’s identity:
hm(x,xT + t) = T −
(
−∂1
∂2
vm(x,xT + t)
)
(7)
= T −A′m(x)−b′m(x)[xT + t−Am(x)],
where ∂1 and ∂2 denote partial derivatives, a prime (such as in b′m and A′m) denotes a derivative,
and bm(x) = logBm(x). A standard specification is Am(x) = xam and Bm(x) = xbm , yielding the
linear expenditure system:
xhm = xT − xam−bm[xT − xam+ t].
We use symmetric definitions for females. In particular,
h f (y,yT + t) = T −A′f (y)−b′f (y)[yT + t−A f (y)], (8)
2.4 Optimal Rent Sharing Between Spouses
Let Wm (v,x) denote the present value of marriage for a married male of type x receiving a flow
utility v, and let Wm (x) denote the value of singlehood (derived in the next section). The flow
7The indirect utility function maximizes the utility of consumption c and labor supply h, for a given wage x and
non labor income t, subject to the budget constraint c= xh+ t and the participation constraints c> 0 and h< T .
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value of a marriage contract delivering v utils is
rWm (v,x) = v+δ [Wm (x)−Wm (v,x)] ,
where r is the discount rate and the second term of the right-hand side is the option value of
divorce. We define marriage surplus for males as
Sm (v,x) =Wm (v,x)−Wm (x) = v− rWm (x)r+δ . (9)
Spouses share resources through monetary transfers tm and t f respectively for husband and
wife. These transfers divide the value of the public goods produced in the household. Although
transfers can be positive or negative, both should be positive in equilibrium, otherwise one
is better off remaining single. We assume that spouses share resources cooperatively using
Generalized Nash Bargaining with bargaining coefficient β , whereby transfers tm and t f solve
max
tm,t f
Sm (vm(x,xT + tm),x)
β S f
(
v f (y,yT + t f ),y
)1−β
subject to the condition
tm+ t f ≤C(x,y)+ z.
We thus assume that marriage is made attractive by the production of public goods, whose
value is the sum of two components. The first one is a deterministic function of wages,C(x,y),
while the other, z, is a match-specific component that is drawn independently of wages from a
zero-mean distribution denoted G.
Public goods may take various forms like home production or other household services
making certain purchases redundant. For example, the possibility of talking to each other is
a source of entertainment that makes purchasing books or theatre tickets less imperative to
married couples. In the same way as one imputes housing services to home owners using
hedonic prices, one can think ofC(x,y)+ z as an imputed provision for all the public goods and
services produced in the marriage. Children is a well-known example of such “public goods”
(Becker and Lewis, 1973, Becker and Stigler, 1974). This analogy might be disputed on the
ground that single individuals can adopt children. It is yet more difficult for singles to find
children to adopt and to rear them. Marriage (or cohabitation) can be seen as a more efficient
technology to produce children, the value of which could be imputed by looking at the cost of
adoption.
Of course, this framework is overly simplistic. Individuals differ in many other ways but
labor productivity. For example, the child rearing technology is of lesser value for divorced
individuals with children from first marriage. Indeed, the main reason why we have introduced
the match-specific component of the public good, z, which allows some couples with wages
(x,y) to match and others not to, is that there are multiple personal characteristics that enter the
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definition of attractiveness, which we do not take into account.8 Designing empirically tractable
multidimensional matching models with random search is definitely a promising area for further
research.9
With quasi-linear utility functions, the solution is trivially found to be such that
tm(x,y,z)− sm(x) = β [C(x,y)+ z− sm(x)− s f (y)], (10)
t f (x,y,z)− s f (y) = (1−β )[C(x,y)+ z− sm(x)− s f (y)], (11)
where we denote
sm(x) = Bm(x)rWm(x)− xT +Am(x), (12)
s f (y) = B f (y)rWf (y)− yT +A f (y). (13)
Functions sm and s f are the non labor incomes that exactly compensate singles for not being
offered the marriage option. Hence, a configuration of types (x,y,z) induces marriage only if
the negotiated transfers tm, t f exceed thresholds sm,s f .
Two dating bachelors decide to match if the overall surplus is positive, i.e. s(x,y)+ z > 0
with s(x,y) =C(x,y)− sm(x)− s f (y). The matching probability then follows as
α(x,y) = Pr{s(x,y)+ z> 0|x,y}
= 1−G[−s(x,y)]. (14)
2.5 The Value of Singlehood
The (flow) value of being single for males is
rWm(x) = vm(x,xT )+λmE(y,z)max{Sm [vm[x,xT + tm(x,y,z)],x] ,0}
= vm(x,xT )+λm
¨
max{Sm [vm[x,xT + tm(x,y,z)],x] ,0} dG(z) u f (y)U f dy.
Using the expression for marriage surplus (9), and substituting sm(x) for rWm(x) using (12), we
obtain:
sm(x) =
λβ
r+δ
¨
max{C(x,y)+ z− sm(x)− s f (y),0}dG(z)u f (y)dy. (15)
8From a technical point of view, it also allows to smooth out the discontinuity at the boundary of the matching
set.
9Wong (2003) aggregates individual characteristics into one single index in a Shimer-Smith model with positive
assortative mating. An obvious extension of our model would add to z a function of individual characteristics,
using single indexes to model complementarity in a simple way.
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A similar expression can be derived for females:
s f (y) =
λ (1−β )
r+δ
¨
max{C(x,y)+ z− sm(x)− s f (y),0}dG(z)um(x)dx. (16)
2.6 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a fixed point (um,u f ,sm,s f ) of the following system of equations, where the
first two equations determine equilibrium wage distributions for singles (derived from (4) and
(5)), and the last two equations determine equilibrium values of singlehood:
um(x) =
`m(x)
1+ λδ
´
u f (y)α(x,y)dy
, (17)
u f (y) =
` f (y)
1+ λδ
´
um(x)α(x,y)dx
, (18)
sm(x) =
λβ
r+δ
˜
max{z+C(x,y)− s f (y),sm(x)}dG(z)u f (y)dy
1+ λβr+δU f
, (19)
s f (y) =
λ (1−β )
r+δ
˜
max{z+C(x,y)− sm(x),s f (y)}dG(z)um(x)dx
1+ λ (1−β )r+δ Um
, (20)
with Um =
´
um(x)dx, U f =
´
u f (y)dy, λ =
M(Um,U f )
UmU f
, and
α(x,y) = 1−G[−C(x,y)+ sm(x)+ s f (y)].
We write equations (19), (20) in that form so that sm and s f become fixed points of contracting
operators given um and u f (see Shimer and Smith, 2000).
Shimer and Smith (2000) prove the existence of an equilibrium for a simpler version of
the model. They consider a symmetric equilibrium with a quadratic matching function (i.e. λ
constant). The common distribution of singles (u = um = u f ) is the solution to an equation
similar to equations (4) or (5) :
u(x) =
`(x)
1+ λδ
´
u(y)α(x,y)dy
, (21)
that can be shown to be contracting once u is reparameterized as v = log(u). However, the
general equilibrium fixed-point operator that involves α as well as u is not globally contracting.
Shimer and Smith show that an equilibrium exists but it is not necessarily unique. Tröger and
Nöldeke (2009) prove the existence of an equilibrium in u for all α (the first step of Shimer and
Smith’s proof) for the linear matching case (λ = 1/
√
U).
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Table 1: Percent never married by age
Men Women
1945 to 1950 to 1955 to 1960 to 1945 to 1950 to 1955 to 1960 to
Age 1949 1954 1959 1964 1949 1954 1959 1964
20 20.4 23.0 17.6 15.8 44.8 40.5 36.6 30.2
25 66.6 59.2 49.9 45.0 78.7 70.1 66.0 59.5
30 79.7 74.0 68.8 65.6 85.4 80.7 78.1 74.4
35 86.2 81.7 78.5 76.6 88.3 86.2 84.5 83.0
40 89.6 85.9 83.6 90.9 89.1 87.7
45 91.5 88.2 92.1 90.6
50 93.1 93.0
Note: The Table reports the percentage of men and women who had never married, by age (in row) and cohort (in
column).
Source; Kreider (2005), US Census Bureau, SIPP, 2001 Panel, Wave 2 Topical Module.
3 Data
In this section we present the data used in estimation, and we emphasize a few salient facts on
wage and hour distributions that the model is challenged to replicate.
3.1 Demography of Marriages and Divorces
In the US in 2001, 30.1% of men (24.6% of women), 15 years and plus, were not married and
21 % (23.1%) were divorcees (Kreider, 2005). The median age at first marriage was 24 for
men and 21.8 for women. Table 1 displays the percents of men and women of various cohorts
who had not married at different ages. People are generally getting married later, but women
persistently earlier than men.
In 2001, the median duration of first marriages was 8.2 and 7.9 years, respectively, for men
and women. The median duration between first divorce and remarriage, for those married two
times, was 3.3 years and 3.5, and second marriages lasted 9.2 and 8.1 years on average. About
75-80% of first marriages, depending on cohorts, reached 10 years, 60-65% 20 years, 50-60%
30 years. This indicates a separation rate of around 2.5% per year. For second marriages,
70-80% reached 10 years, 55% 15 years, and 50% 20 years, consistently with a slightly higher
separation rate, around 3% annual.
According to survival data the median marriage duration should therefore be of 23-28 years
instead of 8-9 years. The Poisson assumption is at odds with the data because a large proportion
of marriages never end, and those who end in divorce do it relatively fast, in the first two years.
One way of making divorce rates non stationary in the model is to permit z to change rapidly.
Thus, marriages resulting from a very large z would end fast if new, likely lower values are
drawn soon.
10
3.2 Wage and Labor Supply Data
We use the US Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from 1996-1999. For
every quarter that an individual is in the panel we collect information on the labor market state
at the time of the survey, wages if employed, the number of hours worked, gender, and the
corresponding information for the respondent’s spouse if married. Our sample is restricted to
individuals who are not self-employed or in the military, between the ages of 21 and 65.
We assume the environment stationary and calculate individual mean wages over employ-
ment spells, and mean hours worked over all quarters including non-employment spells. By
this way, we somewhat reduce the transitory noise in wages and hours, and we reduce the
number of labor-market non-participation spells (with declared hours equal to zero). Then
we drop all observations with zero hours worked (individuals and individuals’ spouses never
employed in the 4-year period). This is definitely not a satisfactory procedure but the model
cannot deal (for the moment) with both the extensive and the intensive margins of labor market
participation. We also trim the 1% top and bottom wages to clean the data. In our sam-
ple, 2N/(2N +Um+U f ) = 50.3% of the population is married, out of Lm = 13,223 males
and L f = 13,925 females. There is a slight deficit of single males vis-a-vis single females:
Um/U f = 0.9 (N = 6,827,Um = 6,386,U f = 7,098).
3.3 Wage Distributions
Figure 1a shows the Gaussian kernel density estimates of wage distributions by gender and
marriage status. Married males have higher and more dispersed wages than single males. Single
males, and single and married females exhibit strikingly similar wage distributions. Panel (b)
displays the corresponding CDFs. The wage scale is in logs so as to emphasize the non normality
of the distributions: both tails are fatter than for a normal distribution.
The figure in Panel (c) plots the joint distribution of wages among married couples, also
estimated using a Gaussian kernel density. The most salient feature of this distribution is its
very large support. Virtually all wage configurations, like a low male wage and a high female
wage or vice versa, exist in the sample. Spouses’ wages are only weakly correlated (25%),
but the wage density is clearly oriented along the dominant diagonal (see the flat projection in
Panel (d)). These patterns (wide support, low correlation) justify the introduction of the match-
specific externality component (z): it allows for imperfect sorting due to unobserved matching
characteristics and explains both the low correlation and the large support.
At this stage, the data seem like an impossible challenge for the theory. Such a low correlation
between x and y tends to indicate a very little amount of sorting based on wages. However, the
estimation of the model has some interesting surprises in store.
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Figure 1: Wage distributions
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(a) Mean hours given own wage
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3.4 Hours
Figure 2a displays nonparametric kernel estimates of mean hours given own wage for single
and married individuals. A clear ordering appears: married males work more than single males,
who work more than single females, who work much more than married females. Marriage
allows men to specialize in wage-work and women in household production. Note that the labor
supply profiles of singles tend to tilt upwards, being more like married females’ at low wages
and more like married males’ at high wages.
Panel (b) plots conditional mean hour estimates given both wages for married males and
married females. There is some evidence of complementarity: male hours are higher and
female hours lower for high wage men married to low wage women, and male hours are lower
and female hours higher for high wage women married to low wage men.
4 Steady State and Matching Probabilities
In this section, we use the steady-state restriction (3) to estimate the shape of the matching
probability α(x,y) as a function of wages. Before showing what it is, we first argue that the
steady-state assumption is an acceptable first-order approximation, even in a changing macro-
environment.
4.1 Divorce Rates
The steady-state equation (3), by relating marriages to divorces, makes it possible to use data
on first marriage ages to learn about marriage duration and divorce frequency. In addition it
can help to tell us which estimate in the bracket [2.5,8] percent per year to choose for δ in the
estimation of other structural parameters.
The average probability for a single man of type x to randomly meeting a single woman and
marry her is equal to
µm(x)≡ λm
ˆ
u f (y)
U f
α(x,y)dy.
At the steady-state equilibrium described by equation (3), we have
µm(x) = δ
ˆ
n(x,y)
um(x)
dy= δ
`m(x)−um(x)
um(x)
,
with a similar formula for single women. The average marriage rate among single men is the
expectation of this quantity:
µm ≡
ˆ
µm(x)
um(x)
Um
dx= δ
Lm−Um
Um
.
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(a) Percent never married by age (b) Median search duration before marriage
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Note: x-marks show 1955-59 cohort data.
Figure 3: Duration of singlehood
Using the data displayed in Table 1 on the distribution of first marriage age of the 1955-1959
cohort we estimate both an age at which individuals start searching for a partner (age0m and
age0 f ) and δ by running jointly the regressions of log survival probabilities on search durations:
logSm(t) =−δ (t−age0m),
logS f (t) =−δ (t−age0 f ),
where Sm(t),S f (t) denotes the probability of not being married by age t respectively for men and
women. We estimate starting ages age0m = 17.3 years and age0 f = 11.8 years. The estimated
divorce rate is δ = 8.0% annual. Figure 3a shows the fit of this simple model, which is good. The
implied median first marriage duration is 8.7 years (mean of 12.6 years), which is remarkably
similar to the value that can be directly estimated from divorce data.
The median waiting time before marriage is estimated 8.1 years for men (mean of 11.7) and
9.0 years for women (mean of 13.0). Figure 3b plots the implied average search durations by
gender and wage (i.e. log(2)/µi(x), i = m, f ). Low wage individuals have to wait for a very
long time, and women more than men. The waiting time decreases with the wage. So, women
get married before men but start searching earlier and take longer.
We obtain this result because there are more female singles (7,098) than male (6,386) in the
sample. Given its simplicity, the model can only explain this difference from different wage
distributions and different effects of wages on preferences and marriage externality. Of course,
many other factors can explain the relative male scarcity in the marriage market, such as a higher
mortality rate.
In the end, we conclude that the steady-state assumption is a reasonable approximation
because estimates of marriage duration from data on wedlock age are consistent with direct
observation. However, Table 1 seems to indicate that marriage and divorce habits do change
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(a) 3-D plot (b) Flat projection
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Figure 4: Matching probability, α(x,y) (with dating frequency twice a year for men)
over time, younger cohorts marrying both later and divorcing more often. This also happens
with unemployment rates, for example, which do fluctuate over time (between 4% and 10% for
the US). Still the steady-state approximation—job destruction rate divided by job destruction
rate plus job finding rate—is a very good approximation. This is because inflows and outflows
may fluctuate over time, yet they do so in tandem, so that net flows remain small compared to
gross flows in all circumstances, which is what the steady-state restriction effectively means.
4.2 The Matching Probability
The equilibrium flow condition (3) implies that
λα(x,y) = δ
n(x,y)
um(x)u f (y)
. (22)
So the matching probability is identified up to the multiplicative factor λ (or λ/δ ) from the
observed distributions of wages among singles and couples.
In absence of (good) data on datings, it is extremely difficult to separate the meeting prob-
ability from the probability of matching given meeting. In order to show the implied shape
of α(x,y), we thus arbitrarily chose λ so that the meeting rate would be twice a year for men
(λm= 1/6). The shape of the implied matching probability, as a function of wages, is unaffected
by this choice. Note that it is likely that no wage combination (x,y) can induce marriage for sure:
α(x,y)≤ 1 for all (x,y). This condition imposes the lower bound maxx,y n(x,y)um(x)u f (y) = 1.37e−03
on λ/δ , or a minimum meeting rate for men of λm = .065, or again a maximum of 15 datings
per year.
Figure 4 displays the estimated matching probability function obtained by replacing wage
densities in equation (22) by the estimates plotted in Figure 1. It is unambiguously increasing
in both wages. More precisely, the matching probability increases exponentially with both
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wages and is rather flat for wages below the median with high-wage women having a very low
probability of matching with anybody else but a high-wage man. This pattern indicates that
positive assortative mating is definitely at work in the marriage market albeit mostly in the upper
tail of the wage distribution. This explains why we find such a low overall correlation between
spouses’ wages.
5 Transfers and Sharing Rule
We now turn to the identification of transfers tm, t f , and the sharing rule in particular, defined
by the proportion tm/(tm+ t f ). We first consider this problem using data on wage distributions
only. We shall address the issue of the information that is provided by labor hours in the next
section.
Let σ be the standard deviation of the distribution of the match-specific component z, and
define G0 as the distribution of z/σ , that is G(z) = G0(z/σ).
5.1 Average Transfers
By inverting the equilibrium relationship between α(x,y) and s(x,y) in equation (14), we obtain
s(x,y) =−σG−10 (1−α(x,y)). (23)
Then, noting that
ˆ
max{z+ s,0}dG(z) = s[1−G(−s)]+
ˆ +∞
−s
zdG(z),
for all s, equation (15) relates sm(x) to total surplus s(x,y) as
sm(x) = βσ
λ
r+δ
ˆ
µG0(α(x,y
′))u f (y′)dy′, (24)
with
µG0(α) =−αG−10 (1−α)+
ˆ +∞
G−10 (1−α)
vdG0(v).
And by symmetry,
s f (y) = (1−β )σ λr+δ
ˆ
µG0(α(x
′,y))um(x′)dx′. (25)
It follows that s(x,y)σ ,
sm(x)
βσ and
s f (y)
(1−β )σ are identified given G0 and λ .
Actual transfers depend on the realized value of the match specific component of the public
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good, z, which we never observe. Define instead expected transfers as
tm(x,y)≡ E[tm(x,y,z)|x,y,s(x,y)+ z> 0],
t f (x,y)≡ E[t f (x,y,z)|x,y,s(x,y)+ z> 0],
where the expectation is of course conditional on matching, s(x,y)+ z> 0. Equations (10) and
(11) imply that
tm(x,y) = sm(x)+βE[s(x,y)+ z|x,y,s(x,y)+ z> 0]
= βσ
[
λ
r+δ
ˆ
µG0(α(x,y
′))u f (y′)dy′+
µG0(α(x,y))
α(x,y)
]
(26)
and
t f (x,y) = s f (y)+(1−β )E[s(x,y)+ z|x,y,s(x,y)+ z> 0]
= (1−β )σ
[
λ
r+δ
ˆ
µG0(α(x
′,y))um(x′)dx′+
µG0(α(x,y))
α(x,y)
]
. (27)
Hence, tm(x,y)βσ and
t f (x,y)
(1−β )σ are in turn also identified given G0 and λ on the support of α(x,y).
Mean transfers are proportional to the bargaining power coefficient (β for men, 1−β for
women). Clearly enough, the same transfer can be obtained with a better outside option and a
lower β . Collective models do not separate these two sources of bargaining power within the
family. Indeed, there is a one-to-one relationship between the minimal utility that the Pareto
program assigns to household members and the equivalent utility weight (or the Kuhn-Tucker
multiplier). In a bargaining model, however, the weight of each individual (log) surplus in the
Nash program (β and 1−β ) is structurally independent of the minimal utility levels (or outside
options). This superior flexibility calls for more data, as identifying β effectively requires
separate data on the size of the cake to be shared between parties and the shares themselves.10
With data only on wages and matching, it is not possible to identify σ either. This is
because the only information that is used to identify transfers is the frequency of marriage for
any particular wage configuration. Marriage occurs in the model when
tm(x,y,z)+ t f (x,y,z) =C(x,y)+ z> 0.
In absence of any additional information on the component C(x,y) of household production,
allowing to anchor it at some known level, we can divide all terms of this equation by any
positive number and the inequality remains true for all x,y. In the next section, we shall ask
whether labor supply data can help to improve the inference on β and σ given our model. The
answer is no.
10For example, Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) use data on firm value-added and wages to identify the
bargaining power of workers in an equilibrium search-matching model.
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(a) Mean total transfers, tm(x,y)+ t f (x,y) (b) Mean total earnings
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Figure 5: Total transfers and earnings
5.2 Average Total Transfers
Average total transfers
tm(x,y)+ t f (x,y) =C(x,y)+E[z|x,y,s(x,y)+ z> 0]
are identified up to the scale factor σ given β ,λ and G0. To use equations (26) and (27)
for estimation, we set β = 0.5 and σ = 1000, the order of magnitude of monthly earnings.
Moreover, we set G0 equal to the CDF of a standard normal distribution. We shall later address
the issue of the separate identification of G0. For the time being, let us assume that it is not too
far from normal. Details on empirical implementation can be found in the appendix.
Figure 5a shows an estimate of the average total transfer function, tm(x,y)+ t f (x,y), and
Panel (b) shows total household earnings (wage times hours worked) for comparison. The two
functions have very different shapes. Household earnings are more or less linearly increasing
in both wages (the mapping is approximately a linear plane). Total transfers, however, seem
largely independent of female wages for all but the highest male wages. Thus, in the marriage
market, a higher wage makes a woman more attractive only to high-wage men (say above the
median wage). By contrast, a higher wage always makes a man more attractive.
The informational source of this inference is two-fold. First, single men do not have very
different wages as single women, whereas married men earn more. This can only reflect a greater
demand for high-wage men in the labor market. Second, this general effect being factored out,
the matching probability strongly increases in both wages above the median. The joint density
of married couples’ wages is thus much fatter in that region than the product of wage densities
for singles, signaling another selection effect: the configuration of two high wages produces a
lot of public goods and is therefore highly demanded.
Of course there may exist alternative explanations, possibly along the line: married men are
older, have accumulated more human capital and are thus better paid. A better model would
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indeed be non stationarity, but this is for the moment, analytically and empirically, out of reach.
In addition, it is striking that the marriage gap in wages applies to men and not to women.
Now, wage differentials may reflect other differences, like differences in education, and it may
be that women value men’s education more than most men value women’s education, with the
exception of highly educated men. This explanation calls for another type of extension, with
multidimensional heterogeneity. This one seems easier to grasp.
5.3 The Sharing Rule
The sharing rule tm(x,y)tm(x,y)+t f (x,y) is identified given β ,λ and G0, irrespective of σ . Figure 6a plots
its estimate using the same calibrations of β ,λ and G0 as in the preceding sections. The median
share of total transfers that goes to a married man with a median wage (2.6 in logs) is about one
half, with some variance depending on his wife’s wage. The same is true for a married woman
with a median wage (around 2.4 in logs). This is expected given the arbitrary choice of 1/2 for
β . However, it is most remarkable that the variance of transfer shares given one’s own wage
is much larger for females than for males. This can be seen most clearly in Panels (b) and (c)
which plot flat projections in (x,z) and (y,z) planes. Looking at the picture more closely, we
see that a linear function of x and y would not be a bad approximation of the sharing rule, with
a positive and steep slope in the x-direction (male wages), and a negative and relatively flatter
slope in the y-direction (female wages).
Summing up, a man who is more productive in the labor market is also more attractive in
the marriage market both by the higher income that he brings to the family, and also by the
larger public good value that he generates. Women contribute to family income and marriage
surplus in the same way, although female wage is a less efficient input of household production
than male wage. This makes a high wage a less attractive trait in a woman than in a man.
Consequently, high-wage men are over-represented among married couples and they are in a
better position to bargain a higher share of the rent.
6 Inference from Hours
We now consider data on hours worked. Let h0m(x) ≡ hm(x,xT ) and h0f (y) ≡ h f (y,yT ) denote
hours for single males and females, respectively. Let h1m(x,y,z) ≡ hm(x,xT + tm(x,y,z)) and
h1f (x,y,z)≡ h f (y,yT + t f (x,y,z)) denote hours for married individuals.
First, note from equation (7) that, for any two men with the same wage x, one being married
and the other single,
h1m(x,y,z)−h0m(x) =−b′m(x)tm(x,y,z), (28)
where y and z are the other characteristics of the married man (i.e. his wife’s wage and the
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match-specific unobserved component). The match component z being not observed, let us
average it out and define
∆m(x,y)≡ E(h1m|x,y)−h0m(x) =−b′m(x)βσ
tm(x,y)
βσ
. (29)
The normalized male transfer tm(x,y)βσ being already identified, this equation identifies b
′
m(x)βσ .
As there is no obvious normalization that can be applied to the income effect −b′m(x), hours
do not help to identify β and σ . We thus obtain a different result from Chiappori (1988) first
because standard collective models do not have unobserved heterogeneity in the sharing rule
(here z), and second because the Pareto equilibrium concept does not allow to define bargaining
power and outside options independently—a difference that we have already emphasized.
6.1 Partial Identification of Individual Preferences
For a given calibration of β and σ , Chiappori’s fundamental result holds: one private good
(labor) is enough to identify individual preferences. Indeed, Bm(x),B f (y) follow as
Bm(x) = exp
ˆ x
0
b′m(x
′)dx′, (30)
B f (y) = exp
ˆ y
0
b′f (y
′)dy′. (31)
Moreover, the two remaining unknowns Am(x),A f (y), can easily be recovered from hours
worked by single individuals. Setting the transfer equal to 0 in equations (7) and (8), these
equations can be rewritten as linear ordinary differential equations:
d[xT −Am(x)]
dx
−b′m(x)[xT −Am(x)] = h0m(x),
d[yT −A f (y)]
dy
−b′f (y)[yT −A f (y)] = h0f (y).
The solution is
xT −Am(x) = Bm(x)
ˆ x
0
h0m(x
′)
Bm(x′)
dx′, (32)
yT −A f (y) = B f (y)
ˆ y
0
h0f (y
′)
B f (y′)
dy′, (33)
using initial conditions Am(0) = A f (0) = 0 and Bm(0) = B f (0) = 1.
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6.2 Estimation of Preference Parameters
We estimate income effects, b′m(x), by regressing ∆m(x,y) on tm(x,y). The corresponding
population parameter is
b′m(x) =
´
∆m(x,y)tm(x,y)n(x,y)dy´
tm(x,y)2n(x,y)dy
,
and similarly for women:
b′f (x) =
´
∆ f (x,y)t f (x,y)n(x,y)dx´
t f (x,y)2n(x,y)dx
.
Then preference parameters A and B can be calculated using equations (32), (33), (30) and
(31).11
Figure 7a shows the estimated income effects, −b′m(x) and −b′f (y), obtained with β = 0.5
and σ = 1000, together with Bm(x) and B f (y) (see appendix for estimation details). Panel (b)
shows estimates of price effects T −A′m(x) and T −A′f (y), as well as Am(x) and A f (y). A
low-order polynomial approximation is shown (dashed curves) for comparison.
For men, leisure (household production) is an inferior good—higher transfers increase hours
worked—whereas for women, it is a normal good. This seems necessary to explain why married
men work more than singles and married women less. Note that this is not an uninteresting
economic result (as it looks like an explanation by exogenous differences in preferences). We
could have found that household transfers are unfavorable to married men, forcing them to
work more to compensate. This is not the way it works. Married men have higher wages than
other categories of individuals because they are more attractive (selection effect). Better outside
options let them draw a bigger share of the surplus. Receiving more transfers, if they also work
more, it must be because they like it. The specialization story where men work more because
they have a comparative advantage in wage-work—indeed they are better paid—leaving women
to perform more household tasks, does not seem to provide a satisfactory description of both
wage and hour distributions when all equilibrium restrictions are respected.
6.3 Identification of G0
The identification of the standardized distribution of the match specific component of the public
good, G0, comes from the residuals of the labor supply equations for couples. Thus, equation
(28) and (29) imply that
h1m(x,y,z)−E(h1m|x,y)
−b′m(x)βσ
=
tm(x,y,z)− tm(x,y)
βσ
=
z
σ
−E
(
z
σ
∣∣∣x,y, zσ >−s(x,y)σ
)
, (34)
11We set the maximal number of hours T equal to the upper bound of hours in the sample, i.e. T = 667 hours per
month (28 full 24-hour days!).
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Figure 7: Preference parameters (the dotted line correspond to 4th order approximations)
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Figure 8: Theoretical and predicted truncated distributions of z/σ for G0 normal
and similarly for females:
h1f (x,y,z)−E(h1f |x,y)
−b′f (y)(1−β )σ
=
z
σ
−E
(
z
σ
∣∣∣x,y, zσ >−s(x,y)σ
)
. (35)
Suppose for a moment thatb′m(x)βσ and s(x,y)/σ can be identified without knowledge ofG0,
then the first equation identifies the distribution of z/σ given x,y and conditional on matching:
z
σ >− s(x,y)σ . It follows that the unconditional distribution of z/σ , aliasG0, is identified ifα(x,y)
tends to one for some limiting value of (x,y). However, it is unlikely that the decision to marry
could be entirely determined by wages, so α(x,y) should be less than one for all x,y. Moreover,
the estimators of b′m(x)βσ and s(x,y)/σ that we have previously designed depend on G0. So,
equation (34) identifies G0 as the solution to a complicated inverse problem. It is thus difficult,
if not impossible, to construct a nonparametric estimator for the distribution of z/σ .
For this reason, we did not attempt to estimate G0 and postulated a standard normal distri-
bution instead; in which case,
µG0(α) =−αΦ−1(1−α)+φ ◦Φ−1(1−α),
where φ is the PDF of the standard normal distribution.12 Figure 8 shows the estimated distri-
12We also experimented with mixtures of two normals with varying kurtosis, and obtained similar results.
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bution density of
h1m(x,y,z)−E(h1m|x,y)
−b′m(x)βσ
+E
(
z
σ
∣∣∣x,y, zσ >−s(x,y)σ
)
=
h1m(x,y,z)−h0m(x)
−b′m(x)βσ
− sm(x)
βσ
− s(x,y)
σ
for males (labeled “predicted males” in the plot) and the symmetric PDF for females (labeled
“predicted females”):
h1f (x,y,z)−E(h1f |x,y)
−b′f (y)(1−β )σ
+E
(
z
σ
∣∣∣x,y, zσ >−s(x,y)σ
)
=
h1f (x,y,z)−h0f (y)
−b′f (y)(1−β )σ
− s f (y)
(1−β )σ −
s(x,y)
σ
The solid line plots the truncated PDF of z/σ for married couples (i.e. given zσ > − s(x,y)σ ),
assuming z/σ drawn from a normal distribution at meeting time.
Two remarks are in order. First the distributions of the thus standardized hours of married
men and women, h1m and h
1
f , are remarkably aligned. Second, the truncated distribution of z/σ
has a much smaller variance (two orders of magnitude smaller!). This discrepancy reveals the
presence of two classical measurement errors with independent and identical distribution.
7 Equilibrium Computation and Low Order Approximation
In this section we want to verify that we can go backwards, that is, calculate the equilibrium
wage distributions and labor supply functions from the previous nonparametric estimates of
the structural parameters, namely, the marriage externality function C(x,y) and the preference
parameters. To calculate the equilibrium (equations (17), (18), (19), (20)) we postulated a Cobb-
Douglas meeting function M(Um,U f ) = M0U
1/2
m U
1/2
f , and estimated M0 as M0 = λU
1/2
m U
1/2
f
for the calibrated value of λ . Despite the lack of a global contraction mapping property, we
found that the standard fixed-point iteration algorithm, xn+1 = Txn, worked well in practice,
even starting far from the equilibrium (like with sm(x) = 0 and um(x) = `m(x)). Details about the
numerical computation of the equilibrium (discretization plus standard fixed point algorithm)
can be found in the appendix.
The just-identified nonparametric estimates unsurprisingly deliver a perfect fit of wage dis-
tributions and own wage-hour supply functions. However the ability of the model to fit the
conditional mean hours given both spouses’ wages is limited by the form of the transfer func-
tions, and the model fails to some extent to fit hours for high wage men and low wage women
(see Figure 9).
Simulating the model using the full nonparametric estimates of the structural parameters
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Figure 10: Fit of the model. 4th order polynomial approximation
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yields, as expected, a perfect fit. What is more challenging is to use a small-order polynomial
approximation of the functional parameters (technical details in appendix). Figure 10 shows
the fit of a 4th order polynomial approximation. It is quite good, despite unwanted undulations
of hours at higher wages.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a prototypical version of a search-matching model of the
marriage market with labor supply, extending the model in Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow
for labor supply. We study its identification and estimation from cross-section data.
The model is rich of interesting lessons. We first show that wage distributions provide
useful information on matching patterns. Despite a low correlation between spouses’ wages,
we estimate a matching probability function that is strongly increasing in both wages. However,
if a high wage is always increasing male attractiveness, a high wage makes a female attractive
only to high wage males. In consequence, a higher wage provides men with a greater share of
the marriage surplus but not women. Finally, with only one private good (labour supply), hours
give no additional information on matching and rent sharing. Differences in hours between
single and married individuals suggest that labor is a normal good for men, but an inferior good
for women.
Many possible extensions of the model easily come to mind, like endogenizing divorce,
either through shocks to z or via on-the-marriage search, or like allowing for other dimensions
of heterogeneity but wages, or introducing children.
Appendix
Computational Details
This appendix shortly describes the numerical tools used for estimation.
First, we discretize continuous functions on a compact domain using Chebyshev grids.13
For example, let [x,x] denote the support of male wages, we construct a grid of n+1 points as
x j =
x+ x
2
+
x− x
2
cos
jpi
n
, j = 0, ...,n.
Second, to estimate wage densities n(x,y)/N, um(x)/Um and u f (y)/U f on those grids we
use kernel density estimators with twice the usual bandwidth to smooth the density functions
in the tails. This is important as, for instance, we divide n by umu f to calculate α according to
(22). Additional smoothing is thus required.
13It can be shown that the error associated to a polynomial approximation (of any order) of an unknown function
at any point x is proportional to ∏nj=0(x− x j). The Chebyshev points are the {x j} j=0,...n minimizing this quantity.
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Third, many equations involve integrals. Given Chebyshev grids, it is natural to use
Clenshaw-Curtis quadrature to approximate these integrals:
xˆ
x
f (x)dx' x− x
2
n
∑
j=0
w j f (x j),
where the weightsw j can be easily computed using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). The following
MATLAB code can be used to implement CC quadrature (Waldvogel, 2006):
function [nodes,wcc] = cc(n)
nodes = cos(pi*(0:n)/n);
N=[1:2:n-1]’; l=length(N); m=n-l;
v0=[2./N./(N-2); 1/N(end); zeros(m,1)];
v2=-v0(1:end-1)-v0(end:-1:2);
g0=-ones(n,1); g0(1+l)=g0(1+l)+n; g0(1+m)=g0(1+m)+n;
g=g0/(n^2-1+mod(n,2)); wcc=real(ifft(v2+g));
wcc=[wcc;wcc(1)];
Note that, although Gaussian quadrature provides exact evaluations of integrals for higher order
polynomials than CC, in practice CC works as well as Gaussian. On the other hand, quadrature
weights are much more difficult to calculate for Gaussian quadrature. See Trefethen (2008).
Fourth, we need to solve functional fixed point equations. The standard algorithm to calculate
the fixed point u(x) = T [u](x) is to iterate up+1(x) = Tup(x) on a grid. If the fixed point operator
T involves integrals, we simply iterate the finite dimensional operator T̂ obtained by replacing
the integrals by their approximations at grid points. For example, an equation like
u(x) = T [u](x) =
`(x)
1+ρ
´ x
x u(y)α(x,y)dy
becomes
u= [u(x j)] j=0,...,n = T̂ (u) =
[
`(x j)
1+ρ∑nk=0wku(xk)α(x j,xk)
]
j=0,...,n
.
It was sometimes necessary to “shrink” steps by using iterations of the formup+1= up+θ(Tup−
up) with θ ∈ (0,1]. A stepsize θ < 1 may help if T is not everywhere strictly contracting.
Fifth, the fact that CC quadrature relies on Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind also allows
to interpolate functions very easily between points y0 = f (x0), ...,yn = f (xn) using Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT):
f (x) =
n
∑
k=0
Yk ·Tk(x), (A.1)
where Yk are the OLS estimates of the regression of y= (y0, ...,yn) on Chebishev polynomials
Tk(x) = cos
(
karccos
(
x− x+x2
x−x
2
))
,
but are more effectively calculated using FFT. A MATLAB code for DCT is, with y= (y0, ...,yn):
Y = y([1:n+1 n:-1:2],:);
Y = real(fft(Y/2/n));
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Y = [Y(1,:); Y(2:n,:)+Y(2*n:-1:n+2,:); Y(n+1,:)];
f = @(x) cos(acos((2*x-(xmin+xmax))/(xmax-xmin))
*(0:n))*Y(1:n+1);
A bidimensional version is
Y = y([1:n+1 n:-1:2],:);
Y = real(fft(Y/2/n));
Y = [Y(1,:); Y(2:n,:)+Y(2*n:-1:n+2,:); Y(n+1,:)];
Y = Y(:,[1:n+1 n:-1:2]);
X = real(fft(X’/2/n));
Y = [Y(1,:); Y(2:n,:)+Y(2*n:-1:n+2,:); Y(n+1,:)]’;
f=@(x,y) cos(acos((2*x-(xmin+xmax))/(xmax-xmin))*(0:n))...
*Y(1:n+1,1:n+1)...
*cos((0:n)’*acos((2*y’-(ymin+ymax))/(ymax-ymin)));
The fact that the grid (x0, ...,xn) is not uniform and is denser towards the edges of the support
interval allows to minimize the interpolation error and thus avoids the standard problem of strong
oscillations at the edges of the interpolation interval (Runge’s phenomenon).
Another advantage of DCT is that, having calculated Y0, ...,Yn, then polynomial projections
of y= (y0, ...,yn) of any order p≤ n are obtained by stopping the summation in (A.1) at k= p.
Finally, it is easy to approximate the derivative f ′ or the primitive
´
f simply by differentiating
or integrating Chebyshev polynomials using
cos(karccosx)′ =
k sin(karccosx)
sin(arccosx)
,
and
ˆ
cos(karccosx)dx=

x if k = 0,
x2
2 if k = 1,
cos(k+1)x
2(k+1) −
cos(k−1)x
2(k−1) if k ≥ 2.
In calculating an approximation of the derivative, it is useful to smoothen the function by
summing over only a few polynomials. Derivatives are otherwise badly calculated near the
boundary. Moreover, our experience is that the approximation:
ˆ x
x
1{t ≤ x} f (x)dx'
n
∑
k=0
wk1{t ≤ xk} f (xk)
gave similar results as integrating the interpolated function.
We implemented these procedures with numbers of grid points such as n= 50,100,500 on
a laptop without running into any memory or computing time difficulty.
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